Global strategic alliances in scheduled air transport - implications for competition policy by Laaser, Claus-Friedrich et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Laaser, Claus-Friedrich; Sichelschmidt, Henning; Soltwedel, Rüdiger; Wolf,
Hartmut
Working Paper
Global strategic alliances in scheduled air transport -
implications for competition policy
Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 370
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Laaser, Claus-Friedrich; Sichelschmidt, Henning; Soltwedel, Rüdiger;
Wolf, Hartmut (2000) : Global strategic alliances in scheduled air transport - implications for
competition policy, Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 370, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2497KIELER DISKUSSIONSBEITRAGE
KIEL DISCUSSION PAPERS
Global Strategic Alliances in Scheduled Air Transport —
Implications for Competition Policy
by Claus-Friedrich Laaser, Henning Sichelschmidt, Riidiger
Soltwedel, and Hartmut Wolf
Contents
• In international aviation, global strategic alliances (GSAs) have in recent years become an important form of coop-
eration between airlines. This cooperation has hit the antitrust nerve of the European Commission. Initially, the
Commission had attempted to constrain both the market share of the major alliances in transatlantic air transport and
their access to major European hubs (London and Frankfurt). The airlines maintain that they need alliances as an
inevitable means to adapt to the changing environment in increasingly liberalized and globalized air transport
markets in order to remain competitive and to fully realize their growth potential. The final verdict by the Commission
will be published soon.
• Though the existing airline alliances are not stable enough to threaten competition and the openness of airline mar-
kets on a global scale, certain hubs or even city pairs might be in danger of being dominated by an individual alli-
ance. This is all the more so as alliances in aviation — contrary to, e.g., strategic R&D alliances in manufacturing —
are based on cooperating in a core area of the participants' commercial activities, which might end in collusion. On
the other hand, alliances may indeed be regarded as an appropriate tool for internationally active firms to remain
competitive.
• For analyzing alliances' impact on competition, networks seem to be more appropriate than city pairs. On the
networks level, complementary alliances usually improve overall welfare via lower fares in all submarkets, whereas
parallel alliances tend to result in higher prices in the former parallel markets and lower in other markets due to
network spillover effects. Since GSAs in aviation are both of a complementary and a parallel nature, no clear-cut a
priori position for or against alliances can be maintained based on conventional antitrust reasoning. From the new
institutional economics perspective, alliances are ambiguous as well, because this perspective highlights the
efficiency objectives of the participating carriers as well as the potential for collusion and opportunistic behavior.
• Empirical evidence on the market shares and pricing behavior of alliances and their members does not as yet reflect
an increasing threat to competition by these forms of cooperation. But it should be noted that alliances appear to be
gaining greater stability over time and that the number of independent competitors is shrinking. These independent
competitors contribute much to the dynamics of the competitive process. If their vital role for competition were to be
restricted, GSAs in airtransport might prove to be detrimental in the long run.
• The European Commission is right to be on the alert about GSAs having potentially detrimental effects on competi-
tion. However, the Commission should avoid overreacting in its zeal to keep markets open (contestable). It should be
borne in mind that market access on transatlantic as well as on most other international air transport routes is still
governed by the administrative provisions of intergovernmental bilateral agreements and not by market forces.
Therefore, the rrtore relevant question for aviation.policy would be whether competition on the North Atlantic routes
could be best maintained by scrapping the bilateral agreements and embarking on a truly liberal open skies aviation
agreement between the EU, the United States, and other countries.
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SCP structure-conduct-performance approach1 Introduction: The European Commission's Concern about Airline
Alliances
In international aviation, new forms of cooperation between firms have emerged in recent years, with
strategic airline alliances encompassing cooperation on a global scale in several instances. Strategic
airline alliances are voluntary agreements between carriers for the purpose of enhancing their inter-
national competitive position — in particular of realizing economies of scale, density, and scope, of
saving transaction costs, and of sharing risks —, without giving up their economic independence.
These cooperations between air carriers have entailed antitrust activities by the European Commis-
sion. A conspicuous case in point is the Commission's attempt to constrain the market share of the
major alliances both in transatlantic air transportation links and with respect to the access to major
European hubs (London and Frankfurt).
On July 8, 1998, the European Commission's Competition Directorate General IV adopted its pre-
liminary position on the approval of two global strategic alliances (GSAs) in scheduled air transport
(SAT), namely those of British Airways/American Airlines as well as of Lufthansa/SAS/United Air-
lines.
1 The Commission made clear that its approval is subject to the fulfillment of specific conditions
by the airlines. Among these conditions are (i) to substantially reduce frequencies on densely served
transatlantic routes for a period of 6 months if competitors who are willing to enter the relevant mar-
kets will be requesting the alliances to do so; (ii) to make available the respective slots in their Euro-
pean basis hubs free of charge if potential entrants cannot obtain appropriate slots; and (iii) additional
measures concerning frequent-flyer programs, computerized reservation systems, interlining agree-
ments and exclusive contracts with travel agencies (European Commission 1998a; 1998b). Only if
these regulatory conditions were fulfilled by the alliances, the Commission would not object to their
formation.
Not surprisingly, the airlines concerned have objected heavily to the DG IV's position and its
regulatory approach to constrain alliances' activities on the North Atlantic routes. They argue that the
proposed reduction in their flight frequencies and the cession of slots to potential competitors would
be an unacceptable intervention into their freedom of contract and that the Commission's competition
policy measures would impair — instead of fostering — competition on global airline markets: hi in-
creasingly globalizing airline markets, the strategy of engaging in alliances would be inevitable for
single airline companies to remain competitive.
2 If the Commission precluded European carriers from
engaging in strategic alliances with North American and Asian carriers in order to gain better access
to respective markets, it would not only restrict the European carriers in their business development
and growth potential, but also prevent the emergence of competitive European global players on
worldwide air traffic markets.
3
Hence, the problem of GSAs in SAT is that, on the one hand, they reflect the attempt of airlines to
exploit the efficiency potential of closer cooperation in globalizing markets, but that they may entail
opportunities for participants to exert market power at the expense of economic welfare on the other.
In our paper, we will analyze and give empirical evidence on the potential threat to competition and
the openness on international markets in SAT. In Chapter 2, we will provide some stylized facts on
the formation of alliances in air transport both concerning the different types of alliances and their
(relative) significance for international aviation. Chapter 3 is devoted to the analysis of the competi-
tive effects of GSAs by looking at strategic alliances in other sectors of globalizing economies (3.1),
A final decision of the Commission has not been made yet, but is expected in late October 2000.
For a comprehensive discussion, see DVZ (1998).
As a consequence of the conditions set by the Commission, British Airways decided to suspend the respective parts on
code sharing and joint fare setting of the alliance agreement for the time being because of the high costs of compliance
(Oum et al. 2000: Section 2.5).by discussing various concepts of competition in network industries, including the perspective of new
institutional economics (3.2), and by providing some empirical evidence on the development of mar-
ket shares and fares (3.3). Against this background, the EC Commission's proposals are evaluated
(Chapter 4).
2 Stylized Facts on Airline Alliances
Strategic alliances have rapidly spread in SAT since the beginning of the 1990s, while they have been
around in this sector for already quite some time: Multiply interconnected networks are a traditional
basic feature of all transport markets anyway. Moreover, the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) agreement after World War II between all major airlines, which was coordinating interna-
tional air transport
4, can be seen as a forerunner of the contemporary strategic alliances in scheduled
air transport. Alliances of independent airlines — more or less specialized on traffic relations in cer-
tain regions due to a restrictive granting of traffic rights in the system of bilateral air service agree-
ments (ASAs) — can be found first in the U.S. domestic market since the mid-1960s. This was still in
the era of tight regulation, when trunk and commuter operators started to cooperate in offering inter-
connected flight options (Button et al. 1998: 99 f.).
hi international aviation, the first strategic alliances, although limited to code sharing
5, have been
formed since the mid-1980s: Two rather small airlines — Air Florida and British Island — started
their code-sharing alliance in 1986, while in 1987 a code-sharing alliance with far-reaching network
extensions was initiated between United Airlines and British Airways.
6 Since the early 1990s, strate-
gic alliances have rapidly spread throughout international airline relations: While even in 1992 most
airline managers did not even mention alliances as a factor furthering the future growth of their com-
panies, since the mid-1990s they share the conviction that the prosperity of internationally operating
airlines will largely depend upon their engagement within a GSA (Littek 1997: 454).
The present structure of GSAs is dominated by five alliances (Table 1). While the partnership of
British Airways and United Airlines of 1987 had meanwhile been terminated,
7 the first of the contem-
porary worldwide alliances was launched in 1989, when the Dutch carrier KLM acquired a stake in
the U.S. major carrier Northwest Airlines. A cooperation between Swissair and Delta Air Lines,
which started in the same year, has recently been terminated in favor of an alliance of Air France and
Delta Air. The Star Alliance was initiated in 1993 by Lufthansa and United Airlines, and in 1996
British Airways and American Airlines announced their alliance. The Qualiflyer Group in its recent
form was founded in 1998 as a follow-up to the cooperation agreement between Swissair and TAP Air
Portugal of September 1997.
8
The agreement also provided for interlining, i.e. through-ticketing on different airlines at industry-standard fares, which
were shared on a pro rata basis (AEA 1999: 18).
Code sharing means that two or more airlines are offering a single flight each under their firm-specific flight number
(code), while the real flight operation is carried out by only one of the partners. By code sharing airline A is able to offer
a larger variety of flight options under its flag, while a substantial part of them is flown by planes of airline B, and vice
versa. See Littek (1997: 452) and Oum and Park (1997: 135).
For details see Oum and Park (1997: 134 f.).
This was done in 1990 after United Airlines had acquired its first own North Atlantic traffic rights from Pan American
(Wiezorek 1998: 313).
For a detailed analysis of the alliances' history (which includes further short-lived alliances such as British Airways/US
Air [1993-1995] and important changes in membership during the early years of the alliance movement) see Wiezorek





































Braathens (Norw.)* Air Europe ; !,
KLM (Netherlands) Air Littoral
















Kenya Airways* South African*
aAsterisks indicate associated members (airlines which have equity links or comprehensive marketing agreements with at least one
of the major partners, but which are not closely tied with other alliance groupings).
Source: Own compilation based on O'Toole (2000).
Common features of airline alliances are that they
• are formed by one (or two) of the major United States air carriers and one of the leading European
airlines
9,
• participate with airlines from other parts of the world,
• cooperate in several (though not necessarily all) of the following fields of airline operations: flight
operations (e.g., joint route planning, crew and aircraft sharing, joint aircraft maintenance), code
sharing, joint pricing and schedule integration, reciprocal frequent-flyer programs and access to
airport lounges, through check-in, joint ground handling, purchasing, advertising and promotion,
cooperation in cargo handling,
1
0
• are open to limited agreements (e.g., code sharing on single routes) with nonmember airlines.
The level of integration realized within the various alliances is not in all respects the same (AEA
1999: 19); rather, "while each alliance is promising the long-term goal of a seamless global service,
there are wide variations in the extent of their togetherness" (Gallacher 1999: 34). Moreover, in the
context of the alliances' openness to limited agreements with outsiders and as a consequence of the
still ongoing process of alliance building




An exception is the Qualiflyer Group, which originally consisted of European members only.
For short summaries of individual alliances' activities, see O'Toole (1999).
Major changes in the alliance structure from mid-1999 to mid-2000 have been: shift of Austrian Airlines from Qualiflyer
to Star Alliance; formation of a new alliance around Delta Air Lines and Air France, thereby cutting Delta's link to the
Qualiflyer Alliance; shift of LOT Polish Airlines, formerly an associated member of One World, to the Qualiflyer Alii-ship of an alliance is not always possible; this has obvious consequences, e.g., for the calculation of
market shares.
The geographical selection of the participating airlines seems to have been done with respect to the
aim of building worldwide networks in order to enable as many passengers as possible to reach their
destinations without leaving the alliance members' services. Thereby the alliances intend "to capture
passengers who would otherwise go elsewhere" (Skapinker 1999). Consequently, each of the five
dominating alliances, with the exception of Qualiflyer, comprise airlines from North America,
Europe, and other parts of the world, mostly Asia and/or Latin America (Table 1).
Each of these alliances cover several fields of airline operations; therefore, they may be called
"broad commercial alliances" in order to separate them from those numerous minor agreements which
pertain to cooperation on one or relatively few routes and thus may be called "simple route-by-route
agreements"; the latter are, as a rule, of a substantially lower intensity (often limited to code sharing),
however, sometimes complemented by joint frequent-flyer programs of the participating airlines.
There seems to be a lot of experimentation going on in alliance formation. According to the latest
survey collected by Airline Business in July 2000, there are now 579 bilateral partnerships in force
among more than 220 mainline airlines (O'Toole and Walker 2000: 46).
1
2 One year earlier, the num-
ber of alliances had amounted to 515 (1998: 502, 1997: 363; see O'Toole 1999: 36).
Of these 579 alliances worldwide, a great number is, in the present context of European competi-
tion policy concerns, of only minor (if any) importance because all of their partners are non-European
airlines. Thus, they pertain more or less exclusively to routes outside Europe and therefore do not fall
within the jurisdiction of EU authorities. An overview of alliances with a participation of European
airlines is given in Tables 2 and 3.
1
3 The majority of these alliances is of the simple route-by-route
category; they are mostly in the form of code-sharing agreements, which reportedly applies to at least
three-quarters of all alliances worldwide (O'Toole and Walker 2000: 46). Alliances with one-sided or
mutual equity investments are shown separately (equity investment alliances); the amount of the
equity stake(s) in the partner airline(s) is given in Table 4.
Note that airline alliances are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There are several cases in which
an airline belonging to one of the five dominant alliances has some (though usually minor) form of
cooperation with members of another alliance. "Neutral" carriers without alignment with any member
of the dominant alliances have agreements, mostly route-by-route, with carriers of different alliances;
these are often airlines of the former East Bloc (see, e.g., the agreements of the Czech carrier CSA).
Furthermore, there are some "associated" carriers (marked by a star in Table 1) which are not mem-
bers of the big alliances but linked to them by separate agreements with one or two core members.
Apart from those carriers listed in Table 1 there are further links to regional carriers that operate
mostly within single countries, thereby completing the mainline carriers' network.
1
4
ance; KLM's withdrawal from its alliance with Alitalia; integration of Aer Lingus within One World Alliance. (These
changes have all been taken into account in the statistical tables.)
The survey excludes cooperation with regional partners, as well as alliances which merely pertain to cooperation on fre-
quent-flyer programs.
The term "European" refers to Europe excluding the former USSR, but including the three Baltic states. - Regional and
all-cargo airlines have been excluded from both tables. Each alliance is shown only once. The airlines are grouped ac-
cording to their membership in the Association of European Airlines and their respective home countries' EU member-
ship.
Several further alliances, mostly of the equity investment type, are of a more special nature. They presumably reflect
former colonial ties between the involved airlines' countries of residence, or long-term strategic considerations, e.g. in
the context of the transition process in Eastern Europe. The most important examples (see Tables 3 and 4) are Air
France's stakes in, and close cooperation with, several airlines of the former French colonies in Africa — which in the
case of Air Afrique, the multinational carrier of francophone West African countries, dates back as far as to 1963 —,
Austrian Airlines' stake in Ukraine International Airlines, and KLM's cooperation with Air Aruba. In the present con-
text, these alliances can be regarded as little more than a further extension of the big alliances.Table 2: Alliances of European Airlines with Other European Airlines as of mid-2000
a
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diterranean Airw. and GB Airw.;
and LOT; Lufthansa with Spanair;
an Airlines; Sabena with CityBird
> alliances. All-cargo and regional
Source: Own compilation based on Airline Business (2000).
To assess the relative importance of the broad commercial alliances quantitatively, we have esti-
mated their global market share in terms of revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) (Table 5).
1
5 On this
basis, the five dominating alliances accounted in 1998 for about two-thirds of worldwide air transport
according to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Star Alliance and its associ-
ated members have a share of one-fourth of the total, followed by One World (17 percent). The three





Alternative yardsticks such as revenue tonne kilometers (i.e., including freight and mail services) or available seat kilo-
meters would hardly make a difference. The delimitation of the alliances is that of Table 1, i.e., regional carriers and alli-
ances of a special nature have been left out. Furthermore, several carriers like Ansett Australia and smaller affiliates like
Deutsche BA had to be omitted from the statistical analysis in spite of their alliance membership, just because the ap-
propriate traffic data were only partially (or not at all) available. (This is referred to in footnotes of the tables.) All ag-
gregate data on alliances should be taken as indicative only because the alliance-building process is not yet finishedand
changes in membership may occur. - A potential candidate for membership in one of the alliances (One World) is the
Greek carrier Olympic Airways, whose management has been taken over by British Airways affiliate Speedwing in 1999
(DVZ2000).
Higher market shares recorded, e.g., in The Economist (1998) refer to a worldwide traffic base significantly smaller than
the ICAO base used here.10
Table 3: Alliances of European Airlines with non-European Airlines as of mid-1999
a
Partner airlines Major airlines (AEA members) of EU countries





































































aOA = Olympic Airways, VS = Virgin Atlantic Airways. — (v) = route-by-route albance for cargo traffic only. For explanation of the other symbols cf. Table 2.
— Further albances (mostly route-by-route): Air France with Air Guadeloupe, TACA Intern. Airu'nes, and TAM Meridionais; Air Liberte with American
Airbnes; Austrian Airlines with Iran Air; Balkan Bulgarian Airlines with Air Moldova; Braathens with Northwest Airl.; British Airways with Comair (South
Africa) and Emirates; British Midland with Royal Brunei Airbnes and Sri Lankan Airbnes; Croatia Airlines with Malaysia Airlines; CSA with Air Ukraine and
Transaero Airbnes (Russia); Deutsche BA with US Airways; KLM with Alaska Airbnes, ALM and Air Aruba; Riga Airlines with Transaero Airlines (Russia);
Sabena with Nationwide Airbnes (South Africa); Swissair with Armenian Airu'nes, Georgian Airbnes, and Vietnam Airbnes; TAP Air Portugal with Linhas
Aereas de Mozambique. — All-cargo and regional airlines are not included.
Source: Own compilation based on Airline Business (2000).11








































































































Source: Airline Business (2000).
Table 5: Development of Market Shares

















aBased on revenue passenger kilometers,
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included with its inter-
Source: Calculated from I ATA (various issues); ICAO (various issues).
In terms of the routes under investigation of the European Commission, the overall market size of
the transatlantic routes between the United Kingdom and the United States is with 12 million passen-
gers per year twice as large as that of the routes between Germany and the United States and three
times as that between France and the United States. The alliance partners British Airways and Ameri-
can Airlines, both of them already being mega-carriers, add up to a market share on the U.K.-U.S.
route of 60 percent (Button et al. 1998: 126 f.).
Against this background we infer that the five alliances, which have engaged in multilevel coop-
eration, are dominant players in major air traffic markets. They could foster a potential oligopoliza-
tion of world air transport markets and can, perhaps with exception of the small Qualiflyer Alliance,
be considered as potentially dangerous for the openness of world airline markets as a whole, due to
the mere size and potential market power of their members.12
3 Potential Competitive Threats of Strategic Alliances
3.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Alliances
Strategic alliances may be seen as an efficiency response to a fundamental change in the business en-
vironment of largely liberalized and globalizing air traffic markets. They may arise from the intention
of the carriers to cut costs, gain easier access to foreign markets, improve technical efficiency, and
reap the gains from networking. However, since the number of actual and potential competitors in the
market declines, the potential to abuse market power may increase (Heinke 1995: 33; Hofer 1991:
512). Hence, the relevance of both the efficiency concern and the anticompetitive concern calls for a
thorough assessment of advantages and disadvantages of cooperative agreements.
The rapid movement in recent years towards forming global strategic alliances is not a unique phe-
nomenon of international aviation, but rather a general phenomenon that is gaining importance in the
international business community at large in the course of globalization. In those industries where
cross-border network business strategies are already a common element of a firm's behavior or will
become so in the foreseeable future, strategic alliances have been formed just as in the automotive
industries, in telecommunications, broadcasting, media transmission, or transportation. '
The economic rationale behind strategic alliances as voluntary (temporary) contractual arrange-
ments between firms is, in particular, to realize economies of scale and scope, to save transaction
costs, to improve their competitiveness against other firms" outside the alliances, and to share risks,
while the independence of partners remains basically intact. International strategic alliances are a
form of cooperation at a less stringent level than transnational mergers. They are seen as an alter-
native to extend a firm's activities to foreign markets without bearing the potential costs of merging




In the following we will look at the efficiency arguments and potential anticompetitive effects in
some more detail.
• Alliances permit, and actually create, flexible and loose forms of partnership. As has been demon-
strated in Chapter 2, the GSAs in SAT can by no means be regarded as being designed according to
a single pattern of cooperation, as stable over time — in fact far-reaching changes in partnership
are still going on — and as strictly exclusive. The impact of these features on competition lies in
less strain on market openness in the future;
1
8 moreover, the nonexclusiveness of membership
might be an additional source of antitrust concern, because it creates links between still competing
alliance networks.
• The momentum for the formation of the alliances is enhanced by the ongoing globalization of mar-
kets.
1
9 Air transport in general is expected to expand strongly with passenger figures doubling be-
1
7 From the vast literature on alliances cf. Hammes (1993: 493 f.), Ringlstetter and Morner (1995: 83 ff), Gotz (1996: 31)
and Backhaus and Voeth (1995: 77 f.).
1 ^ In fact, the option of reversibility and independence of the involved partners is the major source of instability of an alli-
ance due to opportunism of partners and ineffective governance structures (Ringlstetter and Morner 1995: 90 ff.).
1
9 Globalization can be thought upon as the process by which separate national economies are converted into an integrated
world economy by means of international trade, of international factor movements, of an international diffusion of tech-
nology, knowledge and information, of the emergence of global travel and communications patterns, and of a widening
of economic activity patterns from domestic origins towards a worldwide action radius. This integration process at dif-
ferent layers results in increased competitive pressures in product markets, in factor markets and even for the institu-
tional frameworks of states which compete for internationally mobile resources (cf. Siebert 1999: 8 ff.; Siebert and Klodt
1999: 116 ff; Nijkamp et al. 2000: 11 f.). In view of this definition, not only air transport in itself as a means of linking
distant markets all over the world, but also the airline alliance movement may be interpreted as an integral part of the
emergence of integrated world markets.13
tween 1995 and 2005, particularly on international traffic relations (Klein 1996: 12; Wolf 1999: 5).
Alliances serve the end of enhancing the participants' international competitiveness by enabling
them to offer more attractive products and services
2
0 which they are unable to provide separately:
2
1
The participating carriers can serve a much greater variety of origin-destination links
2
2 and;,in ad-
dition, can make use of seamless intra-alliance network interlining. Seamless services within
worldwide networks substantially contribute to passengers' convenience and create network exterT
nalities on the consumers' side.
2
3 As long as air transport services are improved in terms of quality
and network variety, the formation of GSAs would lead to welfare gains. This can be expected in
particular for "complementary alliances" by means of which existing networks are linked with each
other and offer additional traveling options for connecting passengers (Park 1997: 182, 194).
The alliances allow the participants to save costs by exploiting economies of density and scope as
well as by jointly utilizing bottleneck resources. Aviation — in particular after deregulation (Zhang
1996: 293) — is characterized by the emergence of the so-called hub-and-spoke system, which
enables an airline to make use of technical economies of density on the single routes and of geo-
graphical scope for the whole network by consolidating traffic flows (Brueckner and Spiller 1991:
323-325; Brueckner et al. 1992: 323 ff.). Alliances which serve interconnected hub-and-spoke
systems represent a sort of second stage in the evolution of hub-and-spoke-systems after deregula-
tion.
2
4 Moreover, they enable cost reductions by means of a joint use of ground facilities, joint op-
eration and coordination of flight schedules, joint purchase of inputs needed for flight operations
— from toilet paper to airplanes —, joint aircraft maintenance, and also by implementation of im-
proved methods for benchmarking and cost control.
2
5 As a result, total factor productivity of par-




Joint use of bottleneck resources is particularly interesting for slots on airports and traffic rights for
markets barred by restrictive ASAs.
2
7 In this case, alliances help circumvent protective national
2
0 From the supply side, recent technological changes which substantially lowered unit costs and improved safety records
and comfort levels support the ongoing internationalization of aviation (Button 1997: 170).
2
1 It may be less a matter of optimal firm size whether even the currently existing largest mega-carriers are deemed to be
too small in order to offer a complete worldwide network on their own account or not (Oum et al. 1993). In any case,
substantial locational advantages for resident carriers to establish networks in the market of their origin are existing
(Oum and Park 1997: 134). The greatest obstacles to the establishment of truly seamless service networks, however, can
be found in the existing regulatory framework of still restrictive air service agreements which — despite all efforts to de-
regulate aviation markets — prevent carriers from setting up their own international and intercontinental networks (Oum
et al. 2000: Chapter 1, Section 10.6).
2
2 Cf. Button et al. (1998: 109f., 118 f.), who refer to the number of city pairs offered by several alliances: 17,000 for the
meanwhile terminated US Air/British Airways alliance of 1993, 36,450 for the Northwest/KLM alliance.
2
3 Seamless interlining is regarded as attractive to passengers because of lower transaction costs, expectations of better
services, rebates from frequent-flyer programs (FFPs), a lower risk of unsecured connections, less inconveniences, e.g.
by changes between distant terminals or a potential loss of baggage, and shorter passengers' schedule delay times be-
tween desired and actual departure time (Tretheway and Oum 1992: 17 f.; Oum and Park 1997: 134; Park 1997: 181;
Weimann 1998: 213; Oum et al. 2000: Section 2.2). Recent marketing analysis (by means of focus group discussions)
has revealed that frequently flying passengers indeed recognize "seamless travel", a worldwide network and worldwide
FFPs as most important advantages of strategic alliances (Netzer 1999:143-148).
2
4 If different hubs are linked together by trunk routes, at least additional economies of geographical scope can be reaped,
but also further economies of density can result: As long as there are spoke flights with unused capacity, higher load
factors can be reached also for relations under code sharing.
2
5 Cf. Park (1997: 181). Lufthansa expects its membership in Star Alliance to result in cost savings of DM 500 million an-
nually (Glockner 1999: 235).
2
6 Cf. Oum et al. (2000: Section 5.4), who conducted an empirical investigation of airline cooperations over the 1986-95
period, i.e. of the forerunners of the global alliances discussed here. They found total factor productivity (TFP) to in-
crease by 1.7 percent for the whole system of all participating carriers. In a subsample they looked at those cooperative
agreements which covered a variety of issues. In this case, TFP increased even by 4.9 percent.
2
7 Even if slots are.available, still existing bilateral air traffic agreements often do not allow foreign carriers to serve certain
domestic airports as long as the agreements have not yet been developed towards "open skies" agreements (Oum et al.
2000: Section 10.6; moreover, see Wolf 1999 on the regional impact of open skies agreements).14
regulations and barriers to national market entry. By means of GSAs, international carriers can
acquire collect traffic rights which are not granted them by the respective AS As. This may, on the
one hand, foster deregulation of restrictive national ASAs and, on the other, serve as a virtual and
temporal substitute for real mergers and acquisitions which are actually forbidden by local owner-
ship provisions in ASAs {The Economist 1998; Malanik 1999).
hi many markets firms choose strategic alliances as contractual arrangements for containing risks in
the early life cycle of products.
2
8 hi this respect, GSAs in international air traffic seem to be different:
One major difference is related to the market phase in which strategic alliances are formed. Although
air transport markets can still be characterized as rapidly growing in size and transport performance,
they are in general already existing (and mature) markets: other carriers are already serving the trans-
port routes in question. Even if GSAs cover entirely new routes, they cannot be classified as genuine
innovative products. Accordingly, airline alliances are not concerned with creating new knowledge
and product innovations, as is the case for most R&D alliances in manufacturing and other service
industries, but with creating a more dense network of otherwise less interrelated markets. The com-
petitive impact of this difference between GSAs in SAT and other sectors lies in the prospects for
future openness of markets: As long as innovative, inhomogeneous, not yet standardized products in
early phases of the product cycle are concerned, dynamic Schumpeterian competition even calls for
temporary deviations from competitive equilibria; not the least, even patent protection is deemed nec-
essary for progress in manufacturing. As a result, seemingly anticompetitive results in the first in-
stance do not mean permanent monopolization all the time.
hi the case of standardized products in later phases of the product life cycles, however, backward-
looking and preserving strategies, which are typical of cartels, are more likely (Hammes 1993: 497;
Opdemom 1998: 100 f.). hi this respect, it should be kept in mind that GSAs in international aviation
often cover the actual core business of the alliance partners, i.e. providing and selling air transport
services, and are not confined to a well-defined and separated "arena of mutual interest" as is the case,
e.g., for R&D alliances in manufacturing. Admittedly, creating an "arena of mutual interest" which is
separated from the remainder of the partners' business could minimize conflicts and, hence, even
stabilize an alliance (Ringlstetter and Morner 1995: 92 f.). Moreover, cooperation in the core business
of alliance partners might well give rise to anticompetitive behavior if governance structures were
created which could minimize conflict also in this more far-reaching case of cooperation. Taking the
considerations on market phase and on business relevance of cooperation together, the GSAs in avia-
tion could easily give way to outright cartelizing behavior, justifying concerns about anticompetitive
effects, in particular about the openness of markets.
3.2 Different Concepts of Competition
3.2.1 Paradigms of Competition and Antitrust
Apparently, there is no easy way to balance the advantages and disadvantages of GSAs. This is all the
more unfortunate as the three traditional schools of competition and antitrust — the classical Harvard
School with its structure-conduct-performance approach (SCP), the more recent Chicago School of
2
8 In a cross-sector perspective, strategic alliances can mostly be found in sectors with emerging markets, where a high
R&D share in alliance-related investment can be observed and where competition can be characterized as being dy-
namic. This is the case, e.g., where information technology, biological technology and advanced material technology
play a major role, as in the information and media sector, and in the manufacturing of high-tech products. In the 1980s,
70 percent of all enterprises engaged in strategic alliances belonged to these sectors. In many of these cases, strategic al-
liances are directed towards developing new markets which do not yet exist, either geographically or because the inno-
vative product is still not yet developed (Hammes 1993: 497; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1993).15
antitrust approach, and the theory of contestable markets — all have their deficiencies when being
applied to the complex contractual vertical and horizontal arrangements within a network industry.
2
9
According to the SCP approach, the actual market structure (market concentration, product differ-
entiation, size of entry barriers, etc.) determines the conduct of the firms within these structures, such
as pricing behavior or collusive action, which ultimately will be decisive for the firms' performance in
terms of profits, productive and allocative efficiency (Scherer 1973). Under the SCP approach, market
concentration per se is thought to lead to increased prices and profits and a loss of efficiency. Conse=
quently, its wide application in U.S. antitrust in the 1960s and 1970s led to a rather restrictive inter-
pretation of mergers and business practices which were perceived of attempts to exploit or strengthen
market power and which had to be declared illegal per se.
3
0 From that perspective, GSAs are an im-
minent danger for competition and, therefore, efficiency in international aviation, as GSAs in fact re-
duce the number of competitors in the market and lead to an increasing market concentration, even if
neither an alliance's market share in the aggregate world air transport market nor in a single city pair
may be the appropriate focus, but instead the interbrand competition between different networks.
3
1
The Chicago School approach, which was very influential on U.S. antitrust in the 1980s, turned the
SCP reasoning upside down: It considered a growing firm size and increasing market concentration as
being the result of efficient firm behavior rather than a result of anticompetitive intentions (Stigler
1968; Posner 1976). With the exception of clearly detectable horizontal price agreements, antitrust
policy according to the Chicago approach was very permissive towards all kinds of contractual ar-
rangements between firms including vertical and horizontal mergers, the latter being acceptable if
they are likely to yield lower costs in spite of high market concentration. On the basis of the Chicago
approach, GSAs in aviation would get a "wild card" for alliance formation, implicitly denying any
misuse of market power. However, its shortcoming lies in this neglect of market power effects which
may arise in strategic situations in close oligopoly (Bickenbach et al. 1999: 56).
The theory of contestable markets was thought to provide a solution to the relevance of market
power. It stated that even if the actual supplier enjoyed a natural monopoly position, this would not
automatically entail market power and the extraction of monopoly rents. In view of potential compe-
tition on contestable markets without sunk investments, even natural monopolies could not disregard
competition. Market power, however, could be exerted if the incumbent supplier were protected by
important sunk costs which newcomers had to invest and could not recover if their market entry
turned out to be a failure. The existence of sunk costs thus serves as central criterion for market power
and the necessity to regulate incumbent firms' market conduct.
Meanwhile, the theory of contestable markets has lost most of its original appeal, and the original
assessment that air transport services are a prime example of being free from sunk costs and, hence,
perfectly contestable has changed. The reason may be found not only in some basic inconsistencies of
the theory from a game-theoretic perspective but also in the fact that air transport services actually
have proven as being much less contestable than assumed before.
3
2 This clearly limits the theory's
2
9 For the following subsections see Bickenbach et al. (1999: 55 ff.).
3
0 Bickenbach et al. (1999: 55). In an intentionally exaggerating statement Kumkar (1998a; 1998b) characterizes the SCP
test as an approach which already calls for antitrust action if any deviation from the model of perfect competition can be
detected. He refers, e.g., to Shepherd (1988) who introduced a 30 percent market share rule, above which aggressive
business action had to be constrained per se because of the unavoidable danger of predatory pricing.
3
1 The share in the aggregate world market — as presented in Table 5 for illustrative purposes — ignores differences in
regional market structures, while the share on single links does not account for network externalities on the production
side.
3
2 Indeed, Wiezorek (1998: 264) has denied the applicability of the contestability theory to air transport markets, based on
considerations such as the limited availability of slots, possibility of predatory pricing by incumbents, sunk costs for ad-
vertising when launching a new route, and the impact of frequent-flyer programs and computer reservation systems. He
cited Baumol et al. (1988: 501) who had to admit that "several elements of the structure of supply [in the airline indus-
try] conflict significantly with the conditions necessary for the pure theory of contestability to apply without modifica-
tion".16
applicability to antitrust cases in air transport. What may still be worthwile considering, however, is
its focus on alternative sources of market power apart from mere market shares. In other words, it may
be useful to look for the potential sources of limited contestability in aviation in (a) the regulatory
regime of slot allocation, and (b) business practices, such as discriminating computer reservation sys-
tems (CRSs) and frequent-flyer programs. It may well turn out that these issues should be the prime
target of antitrust action, but not monopolization per se. The question to be answered then is whether
an airline alliance can lead to a reduction of options for the successful market entry of outsiders which
otherwise would discipline the abuse of market power. The answer may not be a per se rule, but in-
stead a rule of reason which takes into account an appropriate reference market concept for network
industries.
3.2.2 The Relevant Market of Airline Alliances
Generally, there are three dimensions in which competition between airlines could be impaired:
• Domination of hubs: Specific airports might be dominated by an alliance with the consequence that
only arrivals and departures of alliance partners are offered for services in the most important city
pairs and new (or remaining non-alliance) carriers would have severe difficulties in obtaining slots
at this airport (Button et al. 1998: 131).
• Domination of spokes: Specific spokes or major trunk lines of airline networks might be dominated
by alliances so that the alliance partners in these markets might be able to reap supra-normal
profits.
• Network oligopoly: If, at the end of the day, only five or six alliances survive, global airline mar-
kets could be dominated by tight oligopolistic structures with low competitive pressures.
Domination of Hubs
The case that certain hubs might be dominated by an airline alliance, however, does in principle not
differ from the case of the dominance of a hub by a single carrier, where fares are above costs due to
market power (Borenstein 1989). Note that hub-and-spoke systems are an important ingredient of
efficient airline operations (Brueckner and Spiller 1991). As Zhang (1996: 293 ff.) has shown, treat-
ing an airport as own "fortress" and concentrating operations on it may be a superior strategy of an
airline which operates a hub-and-spoke system. Even if slot capacities on other airports were avail-
able, market entry in a competitor's "fortress" might prove counterproductive for a "fortress" owner,
because it may reduce profits in the own network system if economies of density in the own network
are sufficiently high. This would mean that even if connecting markets were served in competition
from different hubs, the monopolization of the specific hubs might be the natural outcome as long as
there were no options for passengers to reach competing hubs by other modes, such as ground trans-
port.
The higher fares for passengers from and to the hub in question, however, may not necessarily be
incompatible with overall economic efficiency: Spiller (1989) has shown (with respect to the U.S. do-
mestic market) that higher per mile prices in an airline's large hubs (as Frankfurt is for Lufthansa and
London for British Airways) do not necessarily signal market power of that airline. Rather, in the
presence of capacity constraints, efficient prices would require that passengers who originate at the
hub or whose final destination is the hub be charged more per mile than those passengers that use the
airport exclusively as a transfer point. According to this reasoning, fare differentials between direct
and connecting passengers would be warranted anyway in this situation, and it would be necessary to
isolate the effect of hub domination by an airline or by an alliance. If, on the other hand, fares for
connecting passengers were to prove to be in line with comparable fares in competitively served mar-
kets elsewhere, the domination might not necessarily be detrimental to the majority of passengers in
terms of excessive fares.17
Domination of Spokes
The domination of certain spokes or even trunk lines is a more complicated issue. As long as only cer-
tain spokes of a hub-and-spoke system are concerned, higher fares might result from network spill-
over effects of competition which occurs only in limited parts of the network. Brueckner and Spiller
(1991: 340) and Brueckner et al. (1992: 324) have demonstrated that if competition is limited to cer-
tain legs of a hub-and-spoke network, only the fares for these legs decrease due to competitive pres-
sures oh this leg, while fares for other legs not subject to actual competition increase because econo-
mies of density and geographical scope in the network are lost. Thus, if competition occurs only in
limited parts of a network, this can even entail negative externalities for the rest of the network. This
implies that mergers (or alliances) between carriers of course raise fares on city pairs where the carri-
ers directly competed with each other before the merger, but that the positive network effects spill
over via lower fares to those other city pairs where competition is not affected by the actual merger,
e.g. because only one of the partners initially served the city pair. As a consequence, only passengers
on the city pairs with less competition suffer from higher fares while others, in particular connecting
passengers, benefit from lower fares (cf. Brueckner et al. 1992: 330 f.).
Nero (1996: 151 ff.) obtains a similar result based on the same model but with a different network
structure. Again, a merger (vis-a-vis competition in a noncooperative duopoly, which is limited to a
single central trunk line between two hubs) would contribute to the exploitation of a higher degree of
economies of density throughout the whole network. Accordingly, passengers on spokes which are
linked to the central hubs are better off in the merger case, while the situation on the trunk line mar-
kets depends on given parameters. However, the (inferior) case of limited competition on the central
trunk line is still superior to a situation where the two carriers on this trunk line act collusively, be-
cause here profits are maximized jointly, while neither of the carriers can exploit the economies of
density on this gateway.
Three conclusions may be drawn from these findings based on a Brueckner-Spiller type of model:
(i) positive welfare effects of increased competition after deregulation will occur if economies of
density are absent, while their existence may produce the result that a merger can be preferable, (ii)
However, a limited step-by-step deregulation is in any case superior to a situation of collusion be-
tween separated carriers, permitted by persisting tight regulation, (iii) If a merger comprising the rele-
vant network should still be preferable to the competitive case, the merger must be performed in a
way to permit the exploitation of the economies of density, otherwise it would lose its superior cost
efficiency vis-a-vis the case of limited competition, (iv) Keeping in mind that GSAs may be a substi-
tute to transnational mergers which are barred by national ownership rules, a GSA must permit its
participants to cooperate as closely as in the case of a merger.
3
3 The Brueckner-Spiller model sug-
gests that the most appropriate focus of analyzing for the impacts of competition seems to be complete
networks.
Network Oligopoly
Turning to entire networks, however, does not really facilitate the assessment of alliances. Recent
analyses of competitive effects of alliances within whole networks as done by Park (1997: 186 ff.),
using a Brueckner-Spiller type of network model, have revealed that the effects of alliance formation
on fares and economic welfare crucially depend on the character of the cooperation: Complementary
alliances — which provide improved networks and services to passengers — entail lower fares and
higher consumer surplus in all submarkets, and in most cases improve overall welfare, unless the net-
works are not too small and operations are not subject to too high economies of density. Parallel alli-
ances — which primarily permit partners to cancel parallel-running services prior to alliance forma-
3
3 Brueckner (1997) demonstrated that the results for mergers hold in principle also in the case of an alliance. See also
Oum et al. (2000: Ch. 4).18
tion — exhibit the normal Brueckner-Spiller result of higher prices in the former parallel markets and
lower prices in other markets due to network spillover effects. However, aggregate consumer surplus
is likely to decrease and overall welfare would be lower for large networks with moderate economies
of density. Only for small networks and high economies of density, aggregate welfare would improve
as a result of a parallel alliance. Moreover, parallel alliances entail the danger of further alliance for-
mation and concentration of services with even worse results for welfare (Park 1997: 192 ff.). Park's
results are corroborated by the analysis of Oum et al. (2000: Chapter 4) who use a Brueckner-Spiller
model as well and, in addition, present some empirical findings, hi complementary alliances, carriers
are able to increase aggregate output, to generate new connecting passengers, and to cut costs and
fares (because of improved load factors all over the network) so that consumer welfare will likely in-
crease. Just the opposite effects can be derived for parallel alliances which serve only the end of con-
solidating traffic capacities and frequencies in origin-destination markets where the carriers competed
before they formed the alliance. Parallel alliances also entail the risk of facilitating the emergence of a
collusive environment. Hence, Oum et al. (2000: Sections 4.5 and 6.4) recommend encouraging com-
plementary alliances while being cautious in allowing parallel alliances antitrust immunity.
Applying this categorization to real-world alliances, however, does not instantly solve the task of
antitrust authorities, as in most cases GSAs in aviation are both of a complementary and of a parallel
nature: Carriers join their networks and offer integrated services, but at the same time they consoli-
date former parallel-running services. Hence, the question arises whether the complementary or the
parallel component will dominate. Only if (a) smaller airlines with entirely separated pre-alliance
networks cooperated or (b) carriers from small countries with negligible domestic networks agreed on
a code sharing for international flights between their hubs, the result would be unambiguous because
these cases come close to the ideal types of a complementary or a parallel alliance (Oum et al. 2000:
Sections 10.6.2 and 12.2). The five dominating airline alliances clearly do not belong to these polar
cases. But how can one gain additional insights into their nature? A promising avenue could be to
relate their conduct in network formation to aggregate market evolution. This is actually done in a
more general theoretical microeconomic approach on strategic alliances by Morasch (1994, 1995).
The Morasch approach aims at modeling the conduct of firms engaged in a strategic alliance in
oligopolistic markets. The model does not address airline alliances or any other specific sector but
deals with any kind of strategic alliances in wide and close oligopolies.
3
4 Nevertheless, the differen-
tiated findings on GSAs in aviation by Park (1997) and Oum et al. (2000) appear to be broadly in line
with the more general findings by Morasch (1994, 1995): Starting from a Cournot equilibrium in an
oligopolistic product market, the general approach produces the result that profit incentives exist
either to expand output (if a firm is striving for the Stackelberg market leader position) or to reduce
output (if implications of mutual actions for joint profits are accounted for and internalized). Apply-
ing this basic approach to strategic alliances in oligopolistic markets, Morasch can demonstrate that
the first effect will dominate if alliance partners are able to pull ahead from firms outside of the alli-
ance — this will be the case in wide oligopolies with a sufficient number of external suppliers, hi
contrast, the second effect of reducing output will dominate if the alliance encompasses the majority
of dominant suppliers. Morasch's model supports the intuitive conclusion that a dominant position of
alliance members on the relevant markets will increase the probability of an abuse of market power
(Opdemom 1998: 106 f.).
Although the Morasch approach relies on a more simplified SCP reasoning, one is inclined to in-
terpret complementary airline alliances as options for expanding output, while parallel alliances tend
to reduce output. Moreover, as long as a complementary airline alliance does not cover all major car-
riers, expanding output by improving networks is a promising welfare-enhancing approach to achieve
competitive advantages vis-a-vis the rest of the airline business community. In contrast to this con-
For a summarizing description of Morasch's alliance model see Opdemom (1998: 102 ff.) and Seidenfus (1998: 8).19
elusion, service consolidation activities by parallel alliances whose members already cover most of
the profitable network links would give rise to antitrust concern.
There is, however, one striking difference between Park (1997) and Oum et al. (2000) on the one
hand and Morasch (1994, 1995) on the other. Oum et al. (2000: Section 12.2) recommend alliances in
important trunk line markets, such as in the North Atlantic market, to grow and to cover most of the
European-North American traffic. This conclusion is derived directly from the Brueckner-Spiller
model, because an all-encompassing alliance would maximize the network effects compared to sepa-
rated alliances of different European and North American carriers. But this would create exactly a
situation in which according to Morasch's general model without network effects the majority of
suppliers would have become members of the alliance and in which the probability of collusive action
and of exterting market power would increase. Hence, both models present dissenting views on the
conditions under which collusive action among carriers may occur.
This puzzle could eventually be solved by taking into account that the model of Oum et al. (2000:
Chapter 4) does neither address the strength of an alliance relative to the entire market nor — as they
explicitly point out in Section 4.5 — sequential dynamic games between participants and outsiders. It
might well be that after network economies have been exploited and have led to decreasing fares, con-
solidation activities would come to the fore whose relevance should increase automatically if the
individual networks of all relevant competitors were merged within the alliance network. Hence, an
implicit change over time from a complementary alliance towards a parallel alliance might result from
an ongoing trend to more alliances.
To be sure, even a mere parallel alliance might not to be harmful if the formation of parallel alli-
ances did not keep pace with the growth of world markets for air transport. In this situation, additional
scope for competitors could be expected to emerge. Equally, parallel alliances would be harmless if
they were not able to foreclose market openness in the long run, i.e. if they did not reduce options for
outsiders to enter the business in the links with consolidated alliance traffic so that antitrust concerns
could be (partly) mitigated. This outcome could be expected if alliances remained as unstable as they
still appear to be.
However, insights from airline network analysis on the important North American market jeopard-
ize the optimism concerning the openness of markets in the future. The analysis of Evans and
Kessides (1994) provides evidence that repeated competition between just the same carriers in differ-
ent locational markets (city pairs) has on average been less intense than competition in other markets
which was performed between several actors, i.e. "multi-market contact" of actors lowers competitive
pressure.
3
5 These results, which could easily be applied to alliances on a global scale, shed some light
on the dynamics of competition and openness in a network context. If the mere number of different
actors meeting each other in different constellations in the various city pairs were to shrink drasti-
cally, even a hypothetical atomistic market structure in a great number of links could mean that the
overall competitive pressures would be reduced due to a global trading of reciprocal oligopolistic
strategies, i.e., that "tit-for-tat" strategies might spread out.
3
6
Another open question is the extent to which carriers would pass on their lower costs arising from
exploiting economies of density in integrated network operations to passengers all over the network if
competitive pressures on a network-wide or global scale were to decrease substantially. Declining
competitive pressures may entail x-inefficiency and could shift the carriers' cost function upwards. As
a consequence, the higher costs from an increasing distance of actual operations from the production
3
5 The notion of "multi-marketxontact" is a phenomenon which is not unusual to industrial economics in general.
3
6 In some sense, mutual consideration might run along comparable lines as interest coalitions between sovereign states in
multilateral trade negotiations under WTO rules are formed, what makes reciprocity without sectoral limitations under
multilateral trade negotiations beneficial in the end (Stehn 1993: 7 ff.; Knorr 1998: 384): Concessions to open country
I's market for commodity A can be traded for country II's concessions for commodity B. However, the same game ap-
plies to retaliation and the consideration to avoid it.20
frontier might well overcompensate the lower costs of an improved exploitation of economies of
density, even if the carriers' behavior according to the Brueckner-Spiller model did not change, i.e.,
that passengers on other relations gained from economies of density on the relation with joint opera-
tion. Admittedly, this argument of an upward shift of the cost function is beyond the scope of the
Brueckner-Spiller model but should be considered as well.
The result of this discussion on different perspectives on relevant airline alliance markets can be
summarized by the conclusion that, based on conventional antitrust reasoning, no clear-cut a priori
position for or against alliances can be maintained. A per se rule against GSAs appears as misplaced
as per se optimism. Instead, the assessment depends on the characteristics of each specific case.
3.2.3 The Competitive Effects of GSAs - the Perspective of New Institutional Economics
hi a NIE view,
3
7 strategic alliances can be looked at as hybrid organizations somewhere in the middle
of the range between market exchange among independent and competing firms, and hierarchies
within enterprises. From this perspective, alliances are motivated by the attempt to save transaction
costs (Hammes 1993: 494 ff.), which are a constitutional part of any interaction between independent
economic agents, be it in market transactions, be it in hierarchies, be it in coalitions.
3
8 Thus, NIE
takes into account all costs that are associated with various contractual interactions in the course of
value-added activities, and in particular costs associated with specific contractual problems due to,
e.g., asymmetric information and opportunism.
Compared to both a pure market setting — with entirely separated buyers and sellers of intermedi-
ate inputs — and the pure hierarchical setting of a merger or an acquisition of the necessary resources,
the formation of alliances as a partial coalition may be a superior strategy to save transaction costs: (i)
To achieve the strategic objectives in a pure market setting, search and information costs, negotiation
and decision costs, and control and enforcement costs of contract performance between independent
and potentially opportunistic trading partners may be excessively high compared with a firm-internal
solution. This is the case in particular in a situation in which a contract has to take account of the use
of resources in the future. In this case the contract must necessarily be incomplete so that contracting
partners may increasingly be tempted to cheat, (ii) hi contrast, firm-internal transaction costs, such as
information transfer and processing costs, decision and control costs, or hierarchical conflict mitiga-
tion costs, which accrue in the case of an acquisition, may lead to inflexibility and to bureaucratic red
tape. Cost comparisons can make the alliance as a hybrid form of cooperation potentially superior to
the extreme cases of market or hierarchy (Hammes 1993: 496). A strategic alliance can be interpreted
as the attempt to combine the advantages of both markets (incentives and flexibility) and hierarchies
(superior organizational options) (Arnold 1998: 62 f.).
Interpreting strategic alliances this way, the transaction cost minimization process does not only
entail the creation of firm-internal cost savings (or the generation of a quasi-rent as a result of coop-
eration, cf. Backhaus and Voeth 1995: 77 f.), but can equally come up with an efficiency gain for so-
ciety as a whole, provided that (a) decisions are not biased, (b) both transaction and production costs
in the alternative cases can be accounted for accurately
39, and (c) transaction costs savings outweigh
3
7 The research program of new institutional economics encompasses property rights theory, the principal-agent approach,
transaction costs theory and the theory of incomplete contracts. See Bickenbach et al. (1999) for a survey on this re-
search program and its implications for antitrust and regulation in network industries.
3
8 In their analysis of strategic alliances, Backhaus and Voeth (1995: 75 ff.) try to bridge the gap between industrial eco-
nomics approaches and microeconomic transaction costs theory. They emphasize the similarities between the transaction
costs associated with vertical barter— as put forward by Williamson (1985)— and with the interaction of firms in
forming coalitions according to Alchian and Woodward (1987; 1988). Hence, coalitions and alliances can be analyzed
within the framework of new institutional economics.
3
9 Hammes (1993: 495, Fn. 12) emphasizes the potential trade-off that economies of scale in the sense of technical pro-
duction costs may be realized to a different degree with different institutional settings.21
potential adverse effects of reduced competitive pressures. If the latter condition is fulfilled, the firms'
decision to form an alliance reflects also for society as a whole the cost superiority of alliances com-
pared with the alternatives.
Note, however, that the NIE perspective does not necessarily discard the results of conventional
competition policy reasoning. NIE does by no means suggest a generally permissive policy stance
(Bickenbach et al. 1999: 13 ff.): (i) In accord with most traditional antitrust approaches, a per se
prohibition of price cartels seems to be justified from a NIE perspective because this ban has to serve
as a second-best substitute for an agreement encompassing cartel members and negatively affected
consumers, which does not come about because of prohibitively high transaction costs, (ii) Also in the
case of horizontal and vertical mergers, the NIE approach admits that anticompetitive effects may be
relevant in situations of significant market power, because incentives for arrangements which help
merging firms save transaction costs and enhance efficiency may well turn out to inefficiencies in
strategic situations. In these instances, a rule-of-reason approach seems to be appropriate.
4^ (iii) For
complex long-term contracts between firms, the NIE approach again does not deny the possibility of
anticompetitive effects which may outweigh transaction-costs-based efficiency gains in cases of mar-
ket power, but recommends a per se permission, unless market power is found being substantial, (iv)
The different intensity of antitrust action — the strict per se prohibition of price cartels as opposed to
the rule-of-reason approach in the case of mergers — is justified by NIE because of the relative
"cheapness" of forming a cartel. A merger (with all the ensuing adjustment problems) would not be
chosen just for the single purpose of reducing competition. Furthermore, mergers are more likely to
generate positive efficiency effects than mere cartels, (v) Complex long-term horizontal and vertical
contracts deserve less concern than mergers because prohibiting them, but at the same time allowing
firms to merge, would mean both a negative impact on competition and an efficiency loss from the
inferior private arrangement, (vi) If efficiency gains were evident, it would be misleading to argue that
the hybrid organizational form had to be prohibited just because it would strengthen the involved




Our upshot from the NIE approach to antitrust is that NIE is somewhat more sympathetic with ver-
tical and horizontal contracts between firms in cases of evidently competitive situations which are not
limited to pure spot market competition, but that it calls for antitrust action just as conventional com-
petition policy does in cases where market power prevails. In these instances, a rule-of-reason
approach is given preference, for mere price cartels even a per se rule, because NIE shares the general
hostility towards horizontal price or quantity fixing arrangements (cartels) (Bickenbach et al. 1999:
15). From this perspective, it could be argued that the effect of parallel GSAs on the intensity of com-
petition may be of greater concern for competition policy authorities than the effect of complementary
GSAs.
NIE can help understand business strategies as a result of transaction cost minimization behavior.
These strategies may well be consistent with dynamic competition and need not be forbidden per se.
Answers to the question of how to assess competitive threats exerted by alliances depend on whether
GSAs in SAT as long-term horizontal or vertical contracts improve worldwide air transport networks
by reducing transaction costs (in the widest sense) or whether they just mask more restrictive forms of
cooperation such as mergers or, in the end, even price cartels. Hence, the NIE perspective suggests to
ask whether these new forms of cooperation between airlines are an efficiency response to a changing
institutional environment in international aviation. Looking at some sector-specific institutional
changes of the recent past can provide some additional evidence in this respect.
4
0 Bickenbach and Williams (1996) demonstrate this for vertical merger.
4
1 See Kumkar (2000, Section C.II.2.C) on a discussion of the use of this argument in U.S. antitrust.22
There have been substantial changes in the underlying regulatory framework, indeed. The process
of deregulation of national and international aviation since the end of the 1970s has contributed to in-
crease both competitive pressures and incentives: On the one hand, national flag carriers can in many
cases, especially within the EU, no longer rely on administrative entry barriers against foreign com-
petitors on domestic markets (Klein 1996: 12). On the other hand, progress in deregulation likewise
creates new options of business activities for carriers by permitting entry into various foreign markets
which as yet are barred by exclusive traffic rights. From a holistic perspective, globalization of air
transport relations, a certain liberalization of market entry and the formation of alliances are mutually
interdependent: Deregulation of many markets in the course of the open skies movement has eroded
domestic monopoly rents of carriers, has given them incentives to erode other carriers' rents on for-
eign markets, and has forced them to penetrate new traffic relations in order to compensate for their
domestic losses.
4
2 While this process offers new opportunities for individual carriers' growth, it has
also contributed to higher risks compared with the status quo ante. Strategic alliances can be inter-
preted as the attempt to balance both new opportunities and risks.
43 The crucial question, however, to
which extent risks of alliance partners are reduced at the expense of otherwise efficiency-enhancing
competitive pressures is still open.
The increased competitive pressures nourish the (familiar) argument that the supply of regular and
scheduled transport services requires at least a certain level of protection against hit-and-run spot
market competition (Button 1996: 275 ff.; Button et al. 1998). According to this argument there exists
a so-called "empty core" of competition which does not permit firms subject to competition by others
to maintain regular services. Such a service package would only be sustainable if it were protected
against erosion from outside and if it permitted cross-subsidization, either between routes or between
time slots, i.e. costs of unused capacity have to be borne at certain times. The higher costs for high-
density services and the lower intensity of competition are the price for the regularity of the services
and the supply of scheduled services. To strengthen their argument, Button (1996: 277 f.) and Button
et al. (1998) allude to ocean liner shipping conferences. They admit, however, that their argument is
rather tentative and needs further research. Underlying this reasoning are notions of "cream-skimming
competition" and issues of spatial and temporal network sustainability, e.g., the issue of the extent to
which economies of scope exist for a bundle of services, hi this respect, GSAs could be justified as an
attempt of the participating carriers to privately produce those barriers to cream-skimming
competition that make scheduled services sustainable at all — or to make for a renaissance of IATA
on entirely private account. However, the former IATA was in essence a cartel, and NIE would join in
the traditional antitrust objections against a wide application of the "empty core" for scheduled
services.
Furthermore, it could be argued that, in the largely liberalized framework in international aviation,
alliances are a substitute for outright mergers given the remaining restrictive ASAs and the local
ownership rules: Foreign ownership of national air carriers is in almost every country either prohib-
ited or limited to minority stakes, hi spite of examples of partial ownership of airlines by other airlines
(some of which are in the range of 40 to 49.5 percent
44), it is therefore generally impossible for an
4
2 BA's European partners in the One World Alliance, notably Finnair and Iberia (and formerly also LOT), all are said to
have joined the alliance in order to profit, in view of their forthcoming partial privatization, from BA's international
network and market presence (as well as from a better position on CRS screens); BA, on the other hand, hopes to
strengthen its competitive position against Lufthansa and the other Star alliance members by building new hubs in
Helsinki and Madrid (and Warsaw) in order to gain additional traffic from Northern and Eastern Europe and South
America, respectively. See Gill (1998a).
4
3 See e.g. Button (1997: 173 f). Some authors, such as Morrison (1996: 237), hold that in the U.S. the airline industry
with its recent mergers of mega-carriers is still in a process of adjustment to the new environment of deregulated markets
though the new framework is in effect now for 20 years.
4
4 Those cases of 80-100 percent stakes listed in Table 4 are mostly subsidiaries of airlines of the same country; one ex-
ception being Deutsche BA which reflects, apart from liberal intra-EU regulations, also BA's former status as one of the
three Allied carriers which were able to operate through the Berlin air corridors. Other exceptions such as Braathens' (of23
airline from country A to possess more than a minority stake of an airline in country B, with the
exception of both countries being EU members.
4
5 It may well be that GSAs are nothing more than a
transitory stage in global market formation. This view seems to be corroborated by Swissair's take-
over of 85 percent of the Belgian carrier Sabena, and British Airways current talks of a merger with
Dutch KLM (Odell 2000). Once foreign ownership rules in liberalized ASAs were abandoned, still
more international mergers of former alliance partners might be the consequence. According to the
NIE scale of antitrust action intensity, this transformation of cooperative agreement would then war-
rant a closer look at potential anticompetitive effects relative to the loose form of an alliance as con-
tractual arrangement between firms, but would equally reveal more of the underlying motives of alli-
ance partners.
4
6 If traditional ownership rules in bilateral ASAs should be liberalized, and if more
full-scale mergers with a higher danger of market foreclosure should loom around the corner, antitrust
action would be warranted, but on the other hand a liberalization of restrictive ASAs — with traffic




The considerations of this section cannot completely ease the concerns of antitrust authorities about
alliances, be they persistent elements of future airline markets or only transitory stages to cross-border
mergers. The NIE perspective highlights at the same time the efficiency objectives of the participating
carriers as well as the potential for collusion and opportunistic behavior. In view of the alliances'
ambiguity also from a NIE perspective, looking at the empirical evidence on the impact of alliances
on market shares and fares is definitely warranted for the antitrust authorities in order to keep track of
what is going on in international aviation.
3.3 Some Empirical Evidence on GSAs in SAT
The empirical picture of alliances is limited insofar as the statistical base cannot yet provide a suffi-
ciently long and stable period of support. Hence, any results presented here are of a preliminary char-
acter. In the light of the theoretical considerations presented above, we will first take a look at alli-
ances' market shares (for a constant membership), which we expect to grow if the hypothesis of
members' increased competitiveness by alliance formation is to be affirmed. Thereafter, we will
investigate the development of fares. If alliances were to enhance their members' efficiency in provid-
ing air transport, we would expect fares to fall (or new low fares being added to a given fare structure)
under competitive conditions; if, however, as a result of alliance formation competition in the relevant
markets were to have lessened, fares would be expected to rise (or the lowest fares in a fare structure
eliminated). We will first present some results for selected route bundles and then address the ques-
tion of competition in a whole network.
4
8
Norway) ownership of Swedish regional carrier Transwede and KLM's ownership of KLM UK mostly also reflect
liberal EU rules.
4
5 These industry-specific foreign ownership laws were originally justified mainly by military defence arguments by which
civil aircraft were seen as reserve transport capacities in wartime. In today's civil air transport markets, however, they
"prevent any real move towards global industry consolidation" (Airline Business 1998a).
4" If mergers were realized in that situation, this could serve as a litmus test both for the reality of transaction costs savings
and for the potential of future market foreclosure.
4
7 It can be demonstrated that once some links between hubs in different countries which are subject to different ASAs are
opened up to competition, traffic diversion will serve as a spillover mechanism from regulated to nonregulated markets
in terms of intensified locational competition between hubs for traffic flows and served links (Gillen et al. 2000).
4
8 Empirical observations about GSA's impact on competition can be derived from statistical sources such as IATA's
yearly "World Air Transport Statistics"; however, it should be noted that since the alliance trend has started, on a really
global level, not before the announcement of their alliance by British Airways and American Airlines in 1996, there are
at most three years, 1996, 1997 and 1998, from which statistical data on early effects of GSAs can be expected at the
time of this writing.24
3.3.1 Changes in Market Shares
The market shares
4
9 of the alliances have changed only slightly after the alliance formation in the
mid-1990s. The market shares of three of those airline groupings which afterwards formed today's
five dominant alliances expanded significantly in the early 1990s (Table 5).
5
0 The expansion
amounted to three percentage points in the case of later Star
5
1 and One World alliances (leaving them
with market shares of about 25 and 17-18 percent, respectively), and to nearly two percentage points
for those airlines which have recently formed the Air France/Delta alliance with a share of about 11
percent. The KLM/Northwest alliance gathered about 9.5 percent of the market during the whole
decade. The share of the smallest grouping, Qualiflyer, grew from 2.8 percent in 1990 to 3.2 percent
in 1995, and then continued to grow reaching 3.7 percent in 1998. Thus, traffic growth of those air-
lines which afterwards formed the alliances had been substantially faster than on world average in the
early 1990s, hi more recent years, the alliances — with the exception of One World — have con-
tinued to expand slightly stronger than total world air traffic, which grew by 18 percent, with Quali-
flyer alliance taking the lead (Table 6).
5
2
Within all alliances, differences in growth rates between individual members are substantially
greater than those between the alliance aggregates or between them and the world total: hi the period
1995-1998, the difference in growth rates between the highest- and lowest-growth airlines ranged
from 33 to 140 percentage points, the maximum growth difference between two alliance aggregates
being just 22 points (Table 6). Thus, there still seems to be a great deal of disparity between individ-
ual alliance members' economic success, which points to ongoing heterogeneity of alliances, which in
turn may raise doubts as to their future stability (Chapter 2).
Note, however, that the stability of alliances seems to have increased in recent years. A study by the
Boston Consulting Group has shown "that 38 per cent of alliances (of all types) in existence in 1992
were still in place in 1995. By contrast, 68 per cent of alliances which were in existence in 1995 were
still going strong in 1998" (Skapinker 1999; see also Oum et al. 2000: Sections 2.3 and 2.4). More-
over, there remain only relatively few major independent airlines which could compete with the alli-
ance members. On a worldwide traffic (RPK) basis, only 17 out of the first 50 IATA members (and
only 5 out of the first 25) carriers are still not linked to one of the Big Four alliances.
5
3 The perform-
ance of these airlines is shown in Table 7. Their possible impact on competition in air transport to,




9 Market shares may be expressed in several terms, the most familiar being (percentages of) the passenger transport per-
formance as measured by worldwide total "revenue passenger kilometers" (RPKs). The use of market shares in alter-
native terms (e.g., transport supply in the passenger or in the passenger, freight and mail sectors as measured by
"available seat - or tonne - kilometers" or transport performance on international routes only) would hardly change the
overall impression.
5^ In Tables 5 and 6, the traffic and market share data have been traced back to 1990 on the basis of the 2000 alliance
membership (Table 1). - Market shares do not add up to 100 percent due to the existence of airlines which (still) are in-
dependent of alliances (Table 7).
5
1 The market share of the Star alliance had to be estimated because traffic data from Air New Zealand were lacking.
5
2 The aggregate traffic of the five alliances grew by 20 percent, the rest of the total world air traffic grew by 15 percent in
1998 over 1995 (calculated from Table 6 data).
5
3 These are Japan Airlines (rank 7), Trans World Airlines (16), Alitalia (18), Malaysia Airline System (22), America West
Airlines (25), Saudi Arabian Airlines (29), Alaska Airlines (30), China Southern Airlines (32), Air China (37), Japan Air
System (38), Emirates (40), El Al (41), Air-India (42), Pakistan International Airlines (43), China Eastern Airlines (45),
Gulf Air (47) and Hapag Lloyd (49). See IATA (1999: 47).
5
4 These reasons are: (i) Some of the independent carriers are former national carriers of Eastern bloc countries such as the
Czech carrier CSA and may sooner or later follow one of the alliances, (ii) The abundant majority of the remaining car-
riers are residents of non-European, mostly Middle East and Asian countries and thus, by virtue of the bilateral air trans-
port agreement between the relevant states, confined to traffic between their own countries of residence and the indi-
vidual European countries (so-called third and fourth freedom traffic) so that they cannot be significant competitors on
intra-European or North Atlantic routes, while some fifth freedom rights held by these carriers do not change the overall
picture.25
































































































































































































































































aRevenue passenger kilometers. — ''Not including Air New Zealand, Ansett Australia, and Spanair. —'



































































































Not including Air Libert^
Source: IATA (various issues); ICAO (various issues); authors' calculations.26
Table 7: Transport Performance of Major Airlines Not Tied to the Big Alliances, 1990-1998
















































































































































































































































































































Source: IATA (various issues); ICAO (various issues); authors' calculations.
However, in several instances the traffic performance (RPK growth) of the nonallied airlines was
comparable and sometimes even better than that of the majority of alliance members pointing to po-
tential outsiders' competition by at least some nonallied airlines. The most prominent one is Ryanair,
a new independent carrier, which grew by 65 percent — faster than most of its alliance-bound coun-
terparts — in 1998 over 1995 (Table 7). Another example is Virgin Atlantic Airways with 36 percent
growth in the same period, i.e., before it became an associated member of Star Alliance. Apparently,
competitive pressures will — apart from rivalry among the different alliances — mostly have to be
expected from newly emerging independent carriers. Since new carriers on a route would be unable to27
do their job without acquiring slots before, this points to the importance of the availability of slots for
competition — liberal ASAs presupposed anyway.
5
5
3.3.2 The Impact of Alliances on Fares for Selected Routes
Whether or not the alliances had any significant effects on fares can only be analyzed on a prelimi-
nary basis.
5
6 We have compared fares on specific North Atlantic routes
57, this important traffic area
being the only one which has been specifically addressed in the EU communication, and fares for
selected routes within Europe; this latter part of the analysis can give additional information on fare
developments, especially by comparing the effects on German-Scandinavian routes, where Star alli-
ance has, by virtue of membership of both SAS and Lufthansa, a rather dominant position, with the
effects on other routes where other alliances' or independent airlines' competition is more intense.
Comparisons have been carried out for fares valid in 1998 and a reference year (1996 with respect to
North Atlantic routes, 1994 for intra-European routes).
5
8 For each route, we have investigated the de-
velopment of the relative difference between the highest and lowest fares (the so-called tariff spread)
as an indicator for the fare structure as a whole.
5
9 We would expect a lessening of competition to
translate into an elimination of the lowest tariffs, indicated by a diminishing of the tariff spread
(negative sign in the last column of our tables).
The results for the North Atlantic routes are summarized in Tables 8 and 9. It can be seen that there
is no clear distinction between fare developments, with respect to the tariff spread, on those routes
where the Commission demanded frequency reductions or slot transfer by alliance members (see be-
low for details), and on the other routes in the sample. This is obvious especially for the routes from
Frankfurt, where business and economy class fares as recorded by the ABC World Airways Guide
have been raised almost uniformly (by 8 percent).
6
0 On traffic relations from London, the by far
wider tariff spread has been widened further. This, admittedly, does not result from the introduction
of new cheap fares on the low end of the tariff structure, but rather from the relatively high increase of
the highest fares; however, there is hardly a difference in the relative fare developments on routes to
Chicago, Dallas and Miami, which attracted the Commission's special attention, and those to other
destinations, which did not.
6
1 Hence, with respect to those North Atlantic routes which are, in the
5
5 This conclusion coincides with an econometric study of the effects of market entry in the United States: "The figures
clearly illustrated that the entry of low cost carrier Southwest on a route had a differential impact from the entry of other
carriers, on average. ... The entry of Southwest resulted in a significantly greater price reduction and increase in traffic.
Both of these impacts were sustained over a one-year period after route entry. The entry of established carriers, such as
United, American, and Delta, appeared to have little or no effect on prices and passenger traffic. ..." (Windle and
Dresner 1995: 24).
5
6 This qualification is referring on the one hand to the continuing instability of alliances on the North Atlantic market, and
to the suspension of code-sharing and joint fare-setting agreements in the British Airways/American Airlines alliance
One World on the other.
5' Pertinent routes are those which the EU Commission particularly thought to be in danger of being dominated by a single
alliance (Frankfurt-Chicago/Washington, London-Chicago/Dallas/Washington) and, comparatively, a few other routes
between Frankfurt or London and U.S. cities (such as New York or Los Angeles).
5° The choice of the reference years was done with respect to the foundation of Star Alliance in 1993 and the British Air-
ways/American Airlines alliance in 1996.
5
9 For analytic purposes, first class and (on the North Atlantic) supersonic fares have been completely ignored, however,
the lowest fares have been taken into account irrespective of any restrictions of their applicability (as to seasonality, ad-
vance purchase, minimum stay, limitation to a certain carrier or the like).
6" It should be noted that the ABC World Airways Guide does not warrant completeness or accuracy of its fare information.
For the fares for routes from Germany to the United States, the lower margins recorded in the guide (Table 8) seem to be
unrealistically high (in contrast to those from the United Kingdom to the United States, see Table 9). But the lower
margins are comparable for all German-U.S. routes so that tariff spread changes of published fares on these routes are
shown accurately. However, undetected developments might be found for fares not published in the guide.
6
1 With special reference to the lowest (Apex) fare category it should also be noted that there are only minor discrepancies
between the rates of increase of the lowest and the highest of the daily and seasonally differing fares.28
Commission's view, in danger of being dominated by alliances, the influence of their market shares
on the level and structure of fares is at best of minor importance — notwithstanding, as Skapinker
(1998) presumes, "an unstated aim of airline alliances is to try to slow the fall in fares."
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Source: ABC World Airways Guide (July 1996, July 1998).
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Source: ABC World Airways Guide (July 1996, July 1998).29
Oum et al. (2000: Sections 6.3.3 and 6.4) investigated the impact of code-sharing agreements on the
North Atlantic market in the early alliance period from 1990 to 1994 on fares and found that the
agreements of KLM/Northwest Airlines and of Delta/Swissair/ Sabena (which does not exist any
longer as Delta is now cooperating with Air France whereas Swissair and Sabena belong to Quali-J
flyer) even reduced fares in the North Atlantic market. For the agreements between British Airlines-
and US Air (which does not exist either) and between Lufthansa and United Airlines (the Star alli-
ance's predecessor) the results were statistically insignificant. Hence, these findings do not suggest
strong anticompetitive effects either.
hi order to determine the effect of alliances on air fares within Europe, we have differentiated our
results as to routes from Germany to Scandinavia (i.e., where the Star alliance partners Lufthansa and
SAS are dominating) and from Germany to other countries in Europe (i.e., routes where Lufthansa
competes with nonmember airlines of the Star alliance). For each route, the tariff spread change in
1998 over 1994 has been calculated.
6
2 If competition on German-Scandinavian routes were to have
lessened substantially as a consequence of the Lufthansa/SAS alliance, one should expect the tariff
spreads on these routes to shrink, and to shrink more (i.e. absolutely higher negative values in the last
column) than they do on the other routes shown in Table 10.
In the case of European air transport markets, the downward pressure on prices, which usually re-
sults from intensified competition, had already increased as a consequence of the EU's Single Euro-
pean Market policy. It materialized mainly in a widening of the tariff spread by adding further low
tariffs to an existing tariff structure
63; this may be seen from the development of the fare structure in
the ten years before 1994: according to the Association of European Airlines (AEA), the average
promotional fare in its members' European traffic slipped from 60 percent of the average normal fare
in 1984 to less than 50 percent in 1994 (AEA 1995: 8) or, alternatively, the tariff spread increased
from 40 to more than 50 percent.
6
4
It can be seen from Table 10 that, indeed, the tariff spread on German-Scandinavian routes shrank
in 1998 by nearly 30 percentage points over 1994, from about 70 percent to just over 40 percent,
mainly because the very low discount fares of 1994 were no longer available in 1998.
6
5 On several
other routes, however, where the Star alliance is without direct relevance because Lufthansa has to
compete with other airlines which it is not allied to, the tariff spread has shrunk similarly, by at least
20 percentage points.
6
6 There are cases where the diminuation of the spread has been substantially
lower, only around 10 or even less percentage points — and on most routes from Germany to London
6
2 In some cases where "high" return fares were not shown (but only one-way fares in that price category), they were re-
placed by the indicated "Eurobudget" fares for which only minor restrictions, compared with those applicable to genuine
"low" fares, apply. For details see the "Fare notes" in the appropriate Airways Guide. — With respect to routes to
Austria, remember that Austrian Airlines in 1998 still had not joined Star alliance.
6
3 The fact that competitive pressures will often result in an enlargement of a given tariff structure (by adding further low
tariffs) rather than in a downward movement of the existing tariffs is common to many transport markets; it has already
been mentioned, with special respect to rail and sea transport, by Predehl (1964: 242, 259). For a more recent statement
on this topic (with respect to air transport) see Hanlon (1994: 21-22); it would go beyond the scope of the present study
to examine the point raised by Hanlon, whether relatively high fares in some relations like those with Scandinavia are to
be explained by lack of charter competition and whether the resulting profits are used by the airlines to cross-subsidize
low fares on routes where the airlines face tough charter competition (e.g., to the Iberian Peninsula).
6
4 A more specific analysis with respect to the routes selected in Table 10 has shown that on nearly all routes, apart from a
few connections to Zurich and Amsterdam, the tariff spread has been widened. Though the extent of this widening dif-
fers considerably between individual routes, the difference in developments before and after 1994 is evident.
6
5 On the other hand, the tariff spread on these routes had, in accordance with the Europe-wide trend observed by the AEA,
expanded from roughly 45 percent in 1984 to about 70 percent in 1994. The addition of new low tariffs to the tariff
structure had resulted, e.g., in a reduction of the lowest return fares Frankfurt-Copenhagen from DM 559 to DM 435 and
Frankfurt-Oslo or Stockholm from DM 839 to DM 637, while at the same time the highest (economy) fares had been
raised from DM 1,032 to DM 1,464 (Copenhagen) or from DM 1,556 to DM 2,183 (Oslo/Stockholm). (Table 10 and
ABC World Airways Guide July 1984).
6
6 Examples from Table 10 are routes to Amsterdam (especially from Frankfurt and Munich), Madrid, Paris, Vienna, and
Palma de Mallorca.30







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aNumbers in brackets = number of one-way passengers in 1996 in thousand according to ICAO (1998). — ^First class fares excluded; EB: Eurobudget fares. —
cDifference between the highest and the lowest fare as percentage of the highest fare. — ^1998 over 1994 in percentage points
Source: ABC World Airways Guide (July 199,4, July 1998).
(and other places in the United Kingdom) the tariff spread has even increased. In most cases, how-
ever, this enlargement may be attributed to the emergence of new competitors such as Debonair or
Gill Airways (Table II).
6
7 The most pronounced enlargement of the tariff spread, by nearly 18 per-
centage points, appeared on the route from Frankfurt to London where British Midland introduced a
new cheap fare in 1998 although the competitive structure in this market had hardly changed — all
competitors which operated the route in 1998 had done so already in 1994.
As for the routes between Germany and other destinations, in most cases, where the tariff spread
was diminished by a percentage substantially lower than on German-Scandinavian routes, the original
tariff spread had also been substantially lower, mainly in the range of 50-60 percent instead of 70 per-
cent. Note that in 1998 and with the existence of the Lufthansa/SAS alliance, the available discount
on the highest fares to Scandinavia was about 40 percent, which is in line with most other European
routes (within the EU) from Germany, i.e., where Lufthansa faces competition from airlines not allied
to it, such as Air France, Alitalia or the Dutch carrier KLM. Where higher discounts were available,
i.e., the tariff spread was greater than 40 percent, this mostly reflected — like the London routes —
special market conditions such as the intense competition of low-cost (former charter) carriers on
routes to Palma de Mallorca.
Turning from the route-by-route analysis to the statistical overview of all selected routes
68, it be-
comes clear that among non-Scandinavian routes there are relatively numerous (38 out of 72; shown
in box of Table 12) cases where the tariff spread has declined only moderately — by less than a quar-
ter
6
9 — or even increased, while there is only 1 of 17 Scandinavian routes where the tariff spread has




For instance, the DM 359 return fare from Hamburg to London, an Apex fare, was offered by newcomer Gill Airways.
In selecting the routes, care has been taken to include all routes from the six German airports listed in Table 10 to Co-
penhagen, Oslo (except from Stuttgart where there is no direct service which is the precondition for the application of
most tariffs of the low categories), Stockholm, and all other European destinations with more than 50,000 (from Frank-
furt: 100,000) passengers on flight stage basis in 1996 as recorded by ICAO (1998); a few additional routes have been
freely selected so as to take into account special conditions such as charter airlines' competition in the case of destina-
tions like Palma de Mallorca.
It should be noted that while in the preceding sections the absolute change in the tariff spread (in percentage points) has
been analyzed, this section as well as Table 12 deals with the relative change in the tariff spread, in order to compare the
changes that had taken place in different routes with initially differing tariff spreads.32
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aNon-European carriers which operate intra-European routes as part of an intercontinental route (so-called fifth-freedom traffic) are not indicated by name; on
relevant routes, their whole
own are not indicated. All
number is indicated by asterisk. Carriers which practice code sharing with carriers which operate the same route on behalf of their
transfer connections are excluded. Carrier's name in brackets means scheduled charter flights. — ''New entrants after 1994 in bold.
Names of airlines of the same alliance operating the same route are in boxes. —
 cChangf in number of independent European competitors 1998 over 1994.
Source: Authors' compilation based on ABC World Airways Guide (July 1994, July 1998).
To sum up, we conclude that the establishment of the alliance between Lufthansa and Scandinavian
Airlines has contributed to some lessening of price competition, in comparison to many of the other
routes analyzed. However, the route-by-route analysis suggests that overall competitive and demand
conditions on a route are as much important as the existence of an alliance when it comes to explain
the tariff spread, in particular (remaining) outsiders' competition, as is shown by the two routes from
Frankfurt and Hamburg to London.
7
0 This underlines the crucial importance of the openness of air
transport markets for new carriers.
70 Further routes where newly emerging competitors (Debonair, Easy Jet, Ryanair, and Virgin Express) were reported to
have pushed drastic reductions in fares were those from Munich to Rome, Barcelona and Madrid, as well as Brussels to
London, Rome and Barcelona, Dublin to Paris and Brussels, London to Amsterdam and Barcelona {Blick durch die
Wirtschaft 1997). There is also evidence that in the wake of the liberalization movement on intra-EU routes, air fares on
domestic routes within several EU countries such as France, Germany and Sweden fell considerably — mainly because
of increased competition from aggressive newcomers (Handelsblatt 1997). In the UK, where the low-cost carrier move-
ment has started, such carriers like Ryanair and Easy Jet meanwhile are said to account for about 15 percent of domestic
traffic and traffic to the rest of Europe (Done 2000).34
Table 12: Selected Air Routes from Germany Classified According to Relative Change in Tariff Spread 1998
over 1994
Route category Number of routes where the tariff spread in 1998 was
Geographic area Independent competi-
tors, change 1994/98
<50% | 50-75% | 75-100%
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3.3.3 On-route Competition versus Network Competition
Is the route-by-route approach really appropriate to grasp the effects of GSAs on competition? The
AEA (1999) argues that the alliances' positive (i.e., welfare-enhancing) effects on passenger service
emerge mostly from network effects. As for the effects of alliances on competition, the AEA empha-
sizes— in line with our above findings — that the competitive situations not on single routes but only
on whole networks are relevant because "for most passengers the relevant market (for assessing the
impact of alliances on competition) is broader than an individual sector or route" (AEA 1999: Para-
graph 7). On networks, such as North Atlantic or Europe-Far East, passengers will be able to choose
between (at least) two alliances so that no single alliance can dominate the market. This is seen as es-
pecially relevant for so-called "interconnecting passengers" who must, for lack of a direct connection
between their airports of origin and ultimate destination, change flights on their journey anyway. Ob-
viously, if changing planes is unavoidable, it is a priori
7
1 of minor importance where it is done. This
enables passengers who intend to travel, e.g., from a local German airport to the United States, to
choose between routings not only via Frankfurt, but also via other hubs such as Amsterdam, Brussels,
London, Paris or Zurich.
The AEA-initiated study therefore concludes "that in the case of interconnecting passengers, the
appropriate market definition will typically cover a range of indirect services between individual city-
pairs. Within this wider market, competition appears to be strong" (AEA 1999: Paragraph 17). This
argument seems to be corroborated by a recently published study conducted by the University of
71 That is, before aspects of competition between alternative routings such as prices, time schedules and convenience of
transfer are taken into account.35
Illinois, which analyzed the itineraries of more than 45,000 travelers and concluded that intercon-
necting passengers who used alliance-bound airlines on their (indirect) trips had paid on average 38
percent less than they would have paid for comparable trips when using airlines that were not member
of an alliance (Briiggemann 1999).
 7
2 According to the AEA study the alliance partners' pricing
strategy aimed at the goal of joint profit maximization with respect to the whole alliance, and not only
with respect to a single carrier, and could thus circumvent the inefficiency of double marginalization.
This way of reasoning would be consistent with the more recent findings on alliances of Oum et al.
(2000: Section 6.2).
An important question in evaluating strategic alliances would pertain to the distribution of the
whole air transport market with respect to passengers who reach their ultimate destination on a direct
flight and interconnecting passengers. The higher the share of interconnecting passengers in total pas-
senger transport, the less relevant the negative impact of alliances might be on the whole merged net-
work; this is due to complementarity effects of the Brueckner-Spiller type which permit fares to de-
crease. According to the AEA study, "on average 33 per cent of passengers on every flight originating
in Germany connect at a European hub in order to travel to a further destination" (AEA 1999: Para-
graph 14). On the basis of data from the air transport statistics of the Federal Statistical Office of
Germany, a somewhat different picture emerges although, due to data restrictions, only some prelimi-
nary hints can be presented here. For instance, in scheduled intercontinental traffic from Germany, the
share of indirectly — with a change in the flight number in another German or foreign airport —
routed passengers amounted to only 15 percent in 1998 (Table 13.)
7
3 Whereas the difference between
the two sources must be ascribed to discrepancies in the statistical concepts and methodology
74, it is
obvious that for those German secondary airports other than Frankfurt with its widespread network of
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on-flight and ultimate destinations is made on the country (not continent) level, these figures
include passengers who travelled to the United States via another American country (e.g., Canada), or to Japan, Thailand or
India via another Asian country (e.g., Singapore).




On direct routes, the study found no difference in passengers' travel costs between alliance-bound and other airlines — a
result which seems to be in line with our own analysis of selected North Atlantic routes.
Table 13 pertains only to intercontinental travel, which is most important in the relevant context. With respect to pas-
sengers whose ultimate destination was a European country, the share of indirectly routed passengers cannot be precisely
calculated but may, on the basis of the available data, be inferred to be minimal.
One of these discrepancies is that the AEA-initiated study refers, as far as travel originating in Germany is concerned, to
all (not only intercontinental) traffic.36
Table 14: Scheduled Intercontinental Passenger Traffic from Germany (other Airports than Frankfurt) by
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include passengers who travelled to the United States via another American country (e.g., Canada), or to Japan, Thailand or
India via another Asian country (e.g., Singapore).
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1998); authors' calculations.
direct flights all over the world, the share of passengers who must use a variety of connecting points
(such as Amsterdam, London, Zurich and of course Frankfurt itself) to reach their ultimate destination
is much higher and may approach even 100 percent as on routes to Australia and Oceania (Table 14).
According to the AEA study (Paragraph 14), a quarter of all passengers traveling between London and
the United States is indirectly traveling from or to other countries, while 18 percent of the London-
U.S. passengers transfer to another flight within the United States.
The problem with these data, however, is that we lack an appropriate simple yardstick for the
threshold level beyond which the interconnecting passengers' share is high enough so that their wel-
fare gains will overcompensate welfare losses of direct passengers. This difficulty is closely related to
the task to decide on a more complementary or parallel character of alliances if both network-widen-
ing and service consolidation activities can be discerned.
7^ It is, therefore, neither justified to classify
the 15 percent share of interconnecting passengers in the Germany- and London-related markets
(Table 13 and AEA 1999: Paragraph 14) as low (because under more liberally granted traffic rights in
ASAs more inter-hub competition would exist), nor the nearly 100 percent in the markets for secon-
dary airports as high (because more liberal ASAs would permit more direct connections). Hence, the
openness of air transport markets appears to be the crucial parameter. The AEA study deals, however,
almost exclusively with effects that GSAs may have within existing networks and existing cost struc-
tures, whereas the important issue of the possibility for newcomers to come and try to introduce inno-
vative concepts — indeed, the question of openness of air transport markets — seems not to have
been adequately taken into account in this study.
7
6
The preliminary empirical picture of airline alliances appears thus to be as mixed as the antitrust
considerations:
7




Oum et al. (2000: Sections 4.4 and 6.5) consider the Lufthansa/United Airlines code-sharing agreement being both of a
complementary and a parallel nature. While it has contributed to an increase in aggregate passenger miles it has not re-
sulted in lower fares.
For instance, in the context of the frequent-flyer programs the study has to admit that "the combination of incentive pro-
grams can place smaller carriers at a competitive disadvantage", but declares that this "is not, in itself, damaging to
competition"(AEA 1999: Paragraph 54).
It should be noted that a study on the competitive impact of airline alliances (including a comprehensive empirical
analysis of fares, traffic volumes and market concentration) is currently being prepared by the DLR (Deutsches Zentrum37
an increasing threat to competition as exerted by these forms of cooperation, all the more so as alli-
ances have not yet acquired any stable form and constellation, but it is equally remarkable that alli-
ances appear to gain more stability over time and that the number of independent competitors is
shrinking. These independent outsiders can be considered as factors which provide for the dynamics
and the momentum of competitive pressures. If their vital role for competition were to be restricted,
GSAs in SAT might turn out to be detrimental in the long run. The final question remains, however,
to which extent the openness of air transport markets for outsiders could be safeguarded without
hampering clearly discernable complementary alliances to unfold their dampening effect on fares.
4 Conclusions: Different Types of Remedies for Competitive Problems
Raised by GSAs in SAT
The preceding discussion has substantiated that the concerns about negative effects of GSAs on the
intensity of competition in international aviation are warranted in the sense that the competition
authorities should be on the alert. GSAs might enable the big carriers to reduce openness in air trans-
port markets by melting their frequent-flyer programs, by the practice of code sharing with its effects
on the presentation of flights in computer reservation systems and by hoarding slots on airports just in
order to block market access for smaller competitors (Flottau 1998). Hence, the EC Commission's
efforts to keep market access open to newcomers are, in principle, quite understandable. The legal
base for its action is the "effects doctrine" according to which antitrust authorities are entitled to an
extraterritorial application of antitrust law in the case of effects for domestic markets even if the anti-
competitive action is done abroad.
7
8 The question is, however, whether the Commission's target is
appropriately defined.
When the Commission decides whether or not to implement an antitrust procedure according to
Articles 85 or 89 of the EU Treaty, it is well prepared to balance positive and negative effects of each
single alliance rather than to adhere to per se rules, all the more so as strategic alliances between
European enterprises in general have been acknowledged by the Commission as a tool to strengthen
the competitiveness of EU industry (Corbett 1993: 387). In its 23rd Report on Competition Policy, the
Commission declared its intention to support any projects that would enable cooperations which are
of mutual advantage to the partners (Fiebig 1996:180; European Commission 1994: Paragraphs 20,
77). When evaluating the effects of GSAs in air transport, the Commission is taking aspects of market
access and, therefore, the openness concept of competition into special consideration.
As a consequence of the establishment of the alliances between Lufthansa, SAS and United Air-
lines on the one hand and between British Airways and American Airlines on the other, the European
Commission has initiated the procedure according to Article 89 of the Treaty of Rome. The Commis-
sion stated that the alliances could be exempted from prosecution under Article 85, provided that the
following conditions were fulfilled by the airline parties to the alliances
79:
flir Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V./German Aerospace Center). This study is commissioned by the German Federal Ministry
of Transport, Construction and Housing (Ehmer and Berster, forthcoming).
7° Most industrial nations recognize this doctrine and, in addition, have signed treaties on mutual cooperation of authorities
(positive comity), such as the United States and the EU (Kleinert and Klodt 2000).
7
9 For full details of the conditions which are only briefly outlined here, see Official Journal of the European Communities
(1998a, 1998b). The Commission's investigation had also been extended to the former alliance of KLM and Alitalia
which had been approved by the Commission in August 1999 on the condition that the routes from Amsterdam to Milan
and Rome are opened for competition by third airlines, including the cessation of the necessary slots and opening of the
FFPs (Siiddeutsche Zeitung 1999b). Recently, however, Alitalia has left the alliance with KLM after the endeavors of
both carriers to merge were not successful, and British Airways is in preliminary talks with KLM which could possibly
result in a merger by which BA possibly would be enabled to make use of the provisions of the liberal Dutch open-sky
agreement with the United States (ITA press 2000).38
• On certain routes between hub airports where a great part of the total capacity is offered by the alli-
ance members
80, they would be obliged, on demand by a competitor, to reduce their weekly fre-
quencies so as to enable independent competitors to operate, in the following half-year IATA pe-
riod, up to 55 percent of all frequencies, and to cede the corresponding slots without compensa-
tion
8




• With respect to other routes to the United States — and vice versa— from Frankfurt and Copenha-
gen (LH/SAS/United Airlines) or London (BA/AA) no frequency reductions, but, on demand by
competitors, a slot transfer was required at conditions comparable to those for the aforementioned
routes between hub airports.
8
3
• Frequent-flyer programs, which the alliance members had intended to combine in order to make
them still more attractive to passengers
84, should either remain separated for each airline or opened
for the participation of other airlines which have no comparable programs at their disposal.
• In computer reservation systems (CRS), double presentation of flights
85 offered by the alliance
members should, even in the case of densely flown routes, not result in the first screen page being
filled exclusively with flights of the alliance members.
8
6
• Travel agents' commission schemes must not aim at or result in any binding of agents to the alli-
ances, and agents' remuneration must exclude any rate differentials according to total turnover,
• On relevant routes, alliance members will be bound to conclude interlining agreements with new-
comers, at least with respect to "fully flexible" fares.
The obvious intention behind the Commission's proposals is to secure, as far as possible, the exis-
tence of several independent operators (at least, more than one operator) on the selected routes be-
tween European and North American hub airports, and to sustain the contestability of these particular
air transport markets. The proposed Commission's rulings on a compulsory and uncompensated slot
transfer as well as on frequent-flyer programs, presentation of flights in CRS, travel agents' commis-
sions and interlining agreements all try to ensure that the possibility of market entry by newcomers
remains open even in cases where it could otherwise be difficult to obtain the necessary slots at highly
frequented airports, or to lure passengers away from well-established networks.
8
0 The routes concerned are Frankfurt-Chicago and Frankfurt-Washington in the case of the LH/SAS/United alliance and
those from London to Chicago, Dallas and Miami in the case of the BA/AA alliance. They were selected according to
the criteria that they have more than 120,000 passengers annually and are served by at least 12 weekly flights by mem-
bers of the relevant alliance.
8
1 This point has not been undisputed at least within the former Commission. Former Transport Commissioner Neil Kin-
nock had reportedly announced that he planned to legalize slot sales within the EU. Competition Commissioner Karel
van Miert was said to have opposed these proposals (Gill 1998b).
8
2 Further details are: frequencies are not to be reduced below 12 weekly flights; ground handling facilities necessary to
operate the ceded frequencies should also be handed over to the competitors on request; frequencies and slots must not
be ceded to any airline to which members of the alliance are linked by stakes or franchise agreements for the relevant
routes.
8
3 The upper limit of slots to be transferred is 108 (24 for hub routes and 84 for other routes) in the case of the
LH/SAS/United alliance and 267 (50 + 217) in the case of the BA/AA alliance. Another limitation to the slot transfers is
that the relevant alliance's competitors shall not be entitled to demand more than 55 percent of all slots used on the rele-
vant route (including slots which the competitors already possess).
8
4 This would result from the fact that a passenger who, dependent on his individual travel needs and airline networks and
schedules, uses different airlines can accumulate miles in a frequent-flyer program the more easier the more airlines par-
ticipate in the program.
8
5 This often results from code sharing which is normally part of alliance agreements: each flight is shown once with a
flight number of the airline who actually performs it, and once with a flight number of the code sharing partner airline.
8
6 According to a consultant's (Roland Berger) analysis, double presentation of flights can easily be used by partners of an
alliance to edge flights of nonmember airlines out of the first CRS screen page from which travel agents use to book, on
average, 85 percent of all trips (the first screen page of a CRS shows at most five offers) (Glockner 1999: 234).39
One problem of the Commission's proposals, however, refers to the question who (i.e., which air-
line) should acquire those slots which the alliances will be required to relinquish. According to the
relevant publications in the Official Journal (1998a, 1998b), the Commission's ideas on this question
seem to be somewhat contradictionary: (i) As regards to Paragraph 10 of the Commission's communi-
cation,
8
7 such slots shall be made available to airlines who want to operate (or expand) services on
the relevant routes and are unable to acquire the necessary slots in the usual slot allocation proce-
dure.
8
8 (ii) As regards Paragraph 19 of the same communication, however, such slots shall primarily
be made available to public authorities which are responsible for the allocation of slots on the
relevant airports, and which shall distribute the ceded slots according to criteria which enhance com-
petition on the markets concerned.
8
9 However, the cessation of slots could result in a less efficient
allocation of slots because of limited knowledge on the most efficient use of scarce resources on the
side of any regulatory agency. The conditions the Commission plans to impose on the alliance mem-
bers represent a serious public interference at actual spot markets for slots without, at the same time,
formulating and enforcing consistent rules for economically efficient slot allocation regimes. This
interference may entail a substantial impediment in the European airlines' struggle for improving of
their competitive position in todays' globalized transport markets against airlines from other parts of
the world (Noack 1998).
Against this background, it is an open question whether the Commission actually overreacted in its
zeal to keep markets open (contestable) and to tackle potential competitive problems raised by the
GSAs. The ceded frequencies could be operated (and slots be used) by other airlines (at least in traffic
relations between EU and non-EU countries) only as far as these airlines have acquired the appropri-
ate traffic rights as granted by the bilateral ASAs; otherwise, the carriers would have to apply for such
traffic rights to both parties of the relevant bilateral ASA (i.e., governments of the states at either end
of the route envisaged).
9
0 It should be borne in mind that market access also on transatlantic routes is
still governed primarily not by slot availability, but by administrative provisions of the bilateral agree-
ments between each of the EU member states and the United States.
Therefore, the more relevant question for aviation policy would be whether competition on the
North Atlantic routes could be best maintained by scrapping the bilateral agreements and embarking
on a truly liberal "open skies" aviation agreement between the EU as a whole and the United States as
well as with other countries.
9
1 We would like to argue that a further liberalization of ASAs would
seem more appropriate than antitrust action against the alliances at the moment, because there would
still exist diverse options for newcomers to find market niches and provide low-priced services if only
traffic rights were granted in ASAs on a liberal base. Note, however, that concerns have been voiced
8
7 This refers to the communication concerning the LH/SAS/United Airlines alliance. The corresponding paragraph in the
communication concerning the BA/AA alliance (reading almost identical) is Paragraph 8.
8
8 Special reference is made to EC decrees 95/93 and 1617/93 with amendments.
8
9 The Commission has tried to specify such criteria by enumerating a few aspects which may be relevant, e.g. an airline is
able to establish competition on certain routes even if it has no extensive network of its own, or an airline is already
operating a route and wishes to increase its frequencies, or an airline has already slots in Frankfurt or Copenhagen (or
London, respectively) so that it can, together with slots ceded from the alliance, reach a considerable frequency, or an
airline has a hub at either or both ends of the route it wants to serve (see Para. 19 or 17, respectively, of the relevant
communications).
9
0 Remember that even in the case of so-called bilateral open skies agreements the unconditional market access is limited
to airlines of the state parties to each agreement.
9
1 The Commission has, however, so far not been successful in gaining from member states an appropriate mandate for
negotiations with the United States (and other nonmember states); rather, competencies for such negotiations still rest
with national governments, and bilateral air transport agreements remain in force. In this context, the Commission
strives for an extension of the scope of EU decrees 3975/87 and 3976/87, which presently govern the application of EU
competition rules to air transport within the EU territory only, to routes to and from third countries such as the United
States (European Commission 1996: Paragraph 100). It has therefore been suspected (Kolf 1998; Noack 1998) that the
Commission's scrutiny into the GSAs has in fact (at least partly) been motivated by the Commission's frustration over
its inability to negotiate bilateral agreements directly on the Union level with third countries.40
about a further liberalization of ASAs giving incentive to more mergers and acquisitions in the future,
substituting for the current alliances and, hence, the current antitrust problem would only be post-
poned. We would suggest a wait-and-see attitude, keeping in mind the higher "costs of marriage and
potential divorce" for unfortunate mergers compared to alliances. These potential future mergers
might then be subject to antitrust measures, but not their more loose predecessors, which would be
less stable anyway due to lower termination costs.
9
2 What would be warranted in this situation, not
only for a more liberalized aviation sector (Gillen et al. 2000), but also for transnational mega-
mergers in other sectors, would be a harmonized application of antitrust rules between trading part-
ners connected by alliance networks (Oum et al. 2000: Section 10.6.3) and, may be, even a more
global form of antitrust which goes beyond the current effects doctrine and positive comity treaties
(Kleinert and Klodt 2000).
9
2 The notion of relatively low stability of GSAs seems — apart from the termination of the KLM/Alitalia and
Delta/Swissair alliances and the other changes in membership mentioned above — to be further reinforced by recent
considerations of Thai Airways International that the airline might leave the Star Alliance after its main competitor in
South East Asia, Singapore Airlines, has joined this alliance effective April 7, 2000 (FAZ 2000). - It must be left for
further observation whether airlines might succeed in raising the stability of their alliances by means of contractual
penalties or similar arrangements; pertinent efforts by, e.g., Lufthansa with respect to its agreements with other members
of the Star alliance have been mentioned by Becker (1999). Should such efforts result in a substantial strengthening of
the alliances' stability, this would certainly warrant some form of reaction by antitrust authorities.41
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